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Increasingly Fond Memories 01 aGrim Past
Despite seemingly successful reforms in many
post-communist countries, increasing numbers
of people have been sliding from the middle class
into poverty. Nostalgia for the late communist era
is on the rise, and a new study warns that the
perceived levels of social and economic decline
surpass the actual ones - wnich could spell
trouble for the reformers
By DAVID S. MASON, ANTAL ORKENY,
al1d SVETLANA SIDORENKO-STEPHENSON

T

HE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TRANSI
tions in post-communist Europe have been a
resounding success in many respects. Democratic
processes and institutions have consolidated with
unexpected speed, and market economies have emerged
rapidly. Economists point to resumed economic growth
(after years of stagnation or decline), rapid expansion of
the private sector, and the ready availability of consumer
goods. Politicians and political scientists are heartened by
the growth of multiparty politics, the orderly electoral and
parliamentary processes, and the emergence of a lively
free press.
Amid all those successes - and much to the surprise of
many Western and local observers - the reformed-commu
nist parties swept into power in many post-communist coun
tries in the mid-1990s, while left-wing opposition forces
began mounting strong challenges to the market-oriented
refonns in other countlies in the region. The left tum in the
public mood was, above all, a reflection of a widespread and
fundamental disaffection with the refonn processes. While a
small minority was doing very well as a result of the market
oriented economic reforms, most people were not, and
alarmingly large proportions of the respective populations
were falling into absolute poverty (see box, "The Swelling
Ranks of Poverty").
The old communist-era "middle class" has been forced
to sink or swim in the new competitive environment. Those
with skills and adaptability have been able to manage, but
much larger numbers have been forced into unemployment
and retirement, which often means poverty.
Dm'id S. Mason is professor ojpolilical science 01 Burler University,
Ind,anapolis. Antal Ork.eny is an associate projnsor allhe lllstilule oj
Sociology. Eorvos Loran.d Universiry, Budapest. Svetla/IQ Sidorenko·
Slephell.\oll is a senior researclleJ" {l/ the AII-RuHian Cell/erjor Public
Opinioll Research. Moscow. The authors are part ojrhe J996 lmematiollal
Social Jusrice Project survey team. The project is suppo/1ed in pan by a
National Council jar SaviN and East EllIvpean Research gram and by fund
illgjlvm Ihe Cemral European Universiry and the Open Society FOllndation
ojB,lig(ma.

From 1991 to 1995, the real incomes of Russia's citizens dropped
by 40 percent. Some, like this man being arrested for stealing
cabbage ill a village near Moscow, resorted to petty crime to
cope with financilll trouble.

The political implications of the increasing social
polarization is compounded by the tendency of most peo
ple to perceive the changes as even worse than they are.
As a comparison between the 1991 and 1996 International
Social Justice Project (ISJP) surveys reveals, people
remember the late communist era and their social posi
tions then in a much more favorable light now than they
regarded them at the time.
PERCEPTIONS OF ECONOMIC DECLINE
In 1996, the ISJP fielded a survey On justice perceptions
in six post-communist societies (Russia, Estonia. Bulgaria,
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and eastern Gennany), repli
cating a 13-country survey from 1991 that had also covered
some Western countries. 1 In both years, the ISJP investiga
tors conducted face-to-face interviews in each country with
nationally representative samples of at least 1.000 respon
dents. The 1996 survey included many of the questions
posed in 1991, allowing for comparisons over time, but it
also included a number of questions about the respondents'
remembered experiences and situations from the earlier
period.
The findings of the 1996 survey for Russia, Estonia,
Hungary, and Bulgaria are already available and reveal a
generaJ pattern. (Estonia is a somewhat special case; see
box, "Russians in Estonia Bear the Brunt of Changes.") In
all four countries, most people feel themselves to be in a
very difficult economic situation and see the problems pri
'Results from the 1991 survey are reported in James KJuegel, David Mason.
and Bernd Wegener, eds., Social Jusrice and Political Change: Public
Opinion in CapitaliST and Posl-COJnnumist States (Hawthorne, New York:
AIdine deGruyter, 1995).
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The celegories have b.... complied based on responses given on a seven.polnt scale, ranging lrom "complelely satisfied" 10 "completely dissatisfied." The cal.
egory "dlssalisfied" includes allihose who picked any of the Ihree "dissallsfied" options. In all lour countries, the "neutral" response lNo. 4 on Ihe scale) was
quite large, which left lew people in the "satisfied" categories.

Figure 2: Sell-Perceived Social Standing
Mean Social Standing
(l:lowj 10:high)

BUlgaria
Estonia
Hungary
Russia

I

Percentage of Gain or Loss
in Position from 1990 to 1996

1991

1996

1989-1990
in Retrospect

loss

Gain

3.92
4.82
4.24
4.02

2.91
4.44
3.93
4.08

5.03
5.71
4.95
5.06

75
56
61
50

4
15
8
18

The measure of the perceived change in social status lor each respondent was
calculated by subtracllng the retrospective social position (column 3) from the

current one (column 2). The Iasl two columns report the perc:enlagea 01
respondents for whom that figure was negative (column 4) or posilive
(column 51 within each national sample.

marily as a result of the economic reforms of the last six or
seven years. When asked about their household incomes,
about half of the respondents in Estonia and Hungary and
two-thirds in Bulgaria and Russia said they had "much less"
than they need. When people were asked to compare their
financ~al situations now (mid-1996) with those of
1989-1991, an overwhelming majority in each country (as
much as 86 percent in Bulgaria) thought their current situa
tion was worse. The present situation was defined as "a lot
worse" by about two-thirds in Bulgaria. a third in Russia,
and a quarter of the respondents in Estonia and Hungary.
The negative evaluations were due in part to very real
economic problems, but it is abundantly clear from the
ISJP surveys that in aU four countries. people remembered
the past much more favorably than they evaluated it at the
time. In both the 1991 and the 1996 surveys, for example,
people were asked how satisfied they were with their cur
rent standard of liVing. In 1996, they were asked an addi
tional question about their standard of living in
1989- 1991 (the year depended on the country). Figure 1
shows the relati ve sjzes of the dissatisfied contingents
within the respective national samples.
The first thing to note in Figure 1 is the high level of
dissatisfaction in 1996 - the middle two columns - with
big majorities in all countries expressing dissatisfaction and
from one-fifth to one-half of the respondents picking the
most extreme choice: "complete dissatisfaction."
Comparing 1991 with 1996, it is apparent that - except
in Bulgaria, where the change is very large - t11cre have
been relatively small increases in the sense of dissatisfaction
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with the standard of living. Nevertheless, the continuing
high levels of dissatisfaction - even in countries that have
begun to show a positive economic turnaround, such as
Estonia and Hungary - must be at least somewhat alarming
for policy-makers in the region.
What is most interesting about Figure I, however. are the
figures in the last two columns: the respondents' 1996 per
ceptions about how satisfied they were with their standard of
living in 1989-1991. In Bulgaria, for example, only 7 per
cent of respondents remembered being completely dissatis
fied with the standard of living in 1989, whereas in the 1991
ISJP survey, as many as 21 percent of a similar sample
expressed such levels of dissatisfaction. There are even larg
er discrepancies considering the broader measure of dissat
isfaction ("'dissatisfaction"). In Russia, for ex.ample, only
17 percent remember being dissatisfied with their standard
of living in early 1991, whereas 65 percent expressed such
feelings in the ISJP survey that year.
That pattern of unrealistically fond memories of the late
communist era is repeated in virtually all answers to ques
tions involving retrospective evaluations of personal and
national economic situations, the political system, and the
respondent's own social status. It is well established in sur
vey research that people often do not exhibit very accurate
recall, and they particularly tend to forget unpleasant events
or circumstances. It is not the accuracy of memory that is
relevant here, however, but the perceived disjunction
between the way things used to be and the way things are
now. Periods of economic decline are always dangerous for
political stability, and it is worse when people percei ve the
decline to be greater than it actually is.
PERCEPTIONS OF SOCIAL DECLINE
The ISJP included two questions about the self-per
ceived social position of respondents: one about the
respondents' class position, and the other about their social
position in society on a JO-point scale. The comparison of
class self-identification from 1991 to 1996 is difficult for a
number of reasons: the declining importance of class as an
ideological construct in post-communist societies (and the
consequent popular confusion about the nature of class);
the dramatic changes in the social structure of those soci
eties accompanying privatization of the economies; and the
fact that ISJP investigators in some countries changed the
class response sets in 1996, reflecting the changes in soci

ety but making comparisons on these questions over a peri
od of time more difficult. For all those reasons, the
answers referring to social position are more reliable and
useful than those on class.
Nevertheless, some general observations can be made
about the changing nature of the class system in post-com
munist societies. There has been a sizable increase in the
percentage of people who place themselves in the "lower
class": in Bulgaria, that group increased from 12 percent of
the sample in 1991 LO 23 percent in 1996, in Russia it rose
from 4 percent to 15 percent, and in Estonia it went from
4 percent La 8 percent. Only in Hungary did this number
decline, from 20 percent to 16 percent, although other stud
ies from Hungary show an increase in self-placement in the
lower class in the early 1990s. 2
Both ISJP surveys asked the respondents to place them
selves on a one-to-IO scale, with 10 indicating high and one
indicating low social standing. The 1996 survey also asked
people where they were on the scale in 1989-1991. Figure
2 shows the mean position for each country for each of
those three responses and the percentage of people whose
current position was lower or higher than their retrospective
position (in the final two columns). In all country samples.
there is a high correlation between subjective social class
and subjective social standing, so the latter is a useful sur
rogate for class.
On average, people in aU four countries placed them
selves fairly low on the social ladder, though the averages
were much lower in countries like Bulgaria, where the eco
nomic situation was particularly difficult, than in Estonia,
where it was better. In every country but Russia, there was a
substantial drop in the average position between 1991 and
1996. As in Figure I, the percei ved decline was much bigger
than the actual one, since people in 1996 remembered their
earlier social positions as much higher (column 3) than peo
ple reported at the time (column I). As is apparent, most peo
ple experienced a decline in social status, and in most coun
tries, very few percei ved a gain for themselves.
Those perceptions of decline can be partly explained by
the real decrease in living standards, but also by a sense of
relative deprivation. That is evident from questions that ISJP
investigators asked about what compensation people feel
they deserve for their work and what they actually get. In
Russia, for example, thaL ratio was 2.3 in 1991 (people felt
they deserved 2.3 times more than they actually earned), but
by 1996, that ratio had grown to four. The higher visibility of
social inequalities such as ostentatious wealth and increased
material aspirations also play an important role when people
evaluate their social positions.
In both Russia and Hungary, the biggest changes in per
ceived socia! status appear at the extremes of the scale, with
people at the bottom of the status scale experiencing the
biggest drop in status, and the people at the top of the scale
perceiving the biggest increases. Consequently, from 1991 to
1996, people were pulled out of the middle categories both in
2p. Rober\. "Egyentosegrudat" ("Perceptions of Inequality], in R. Andorka, T.
Kolosi and G. Vukovich, eds.. Tarsadalmi Riport [Social Repon]
(Budapest: TARKI. 1994), pp. 324-325.

A 1994 UNICEF study of the fonner Soviet bloc
found that the economic changes had "provoked a dete
rioration of unparalleled proportions in human welfare"
and a "health crisis" embodied in rising incidences of
infectious diseases, stress; malnutrition, and alcoholism, 1
The same study reported that in Poland, the country that
had experienced the most rapid and successful economic
turnaround, the percentage of the population living in
poverty had risen from 25 percent in 1989 to 44 percent
in 1992.
In Russia, the population experienced both a decrease
in Jiving standards and growing income polarization.
From 1991 to 1995, real incomes decreased 40 percenL 2
The ratio between the incomes of the wealthiest and
poorest rose from 4.4 in 1990 to 13 in 1996. Declines in
Jiving standards and health care led to an unparalleled
drop in life expectancy for males, from 64 in 1987 to
57.3 in 1994 - lower than that in the Philippines or
Indonesia. A January 1995 poll in Russia reported that
60 percent of those surveyed said they had only enough
money for food, or not even that much)
Conditions vary across the region. In Poland, for
example, most people are better off than the majority in
Russia. But in virtually every country in Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union, most people felt their eco
nomic situation had deteriorated. As late a" 1994, almost
twice as many people rated the fotmer communist econ
omy more highly than the new economic system. Of the
10 post-communist societies included in a 1994 study,
only in the Czech Republic did more people rate the new
system better than the 01d. 4 Support for the new eco
nomic system has risen somewhat since 1994 in most
countries but remains very low in some, including
Bulgaria and Hungary.
c

[Crisis in Mortality. Health and Mltrition, Regional Monitoring
Report No.2 (Florence, Italy: UNICEF Imematiooal Cbild
Development Cente.r, 1994).
2Sotsialnaya sfera Rossii: Statis·ticheskii sbomik [The Social Sphere
of Russia: Statistical Compendium] (Moscow: Goskomstal. 1996).
3L.K. Levashov, et at., Kak zhivesh Rossiya? [How Does Russia
Live?! (Moscow: Russian Academy of Sciences, 1995).
4Richard Rose and Christian Haerpfer, "New Democracies Barometer
Ul: Learning From What h Happen.ing," Studies in Public Policy.
no. 230 (Glasgow: Urtiversity of Strathclyde, 1994).

upward and downward directions, causing an increased
polarization of the social structure and a decline in the size
of the middle class. In the Russian case, for example, the
1991 distribution curve of social position resembled a nor
mal, bell-shaped curve, with the largest number of people in
the middle categories and smaller numbers at the low and
high ends. By 1996, the curve looked more like a saddle,
with the middle positions relatively smaller. A similar phe
nomenon was at work in Hungary.
For all four countries, probably the biggest reason for
decreased living standards, increases in the "lower class,"
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Figure 3: EmPlovmen~ Slalus, 1991 and 1996
(in percentages)
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and decreased social status was a dramatic decline in the
number of full-time employees. In both 1991 and 1996, very
few people with full-time jobs considered themselves at the
bottom of the social ladder or in the lower social class. But
from 1991 to 1996, there was a startling decline in the propor
tion of those with full-time jobs in each country, and big jumps
in the number of retired and unemployed people (see Figure 3).
In none of the four countries was even half the population
working full time in 1996, and in Bulgaria and Hungary only
somewhat more than a third was. It is primarily the increases
in the number of unemployed and pensioners that are expand
ing the ranks of the lower social classes in those societies.
YEARNING FOR THE KADAR ERA
The change in employment structure is one of the biggest
differences in the survey samples in Hungary in 1991 and
1996. The collapse of state socialism and the consequent end
of the so-called caring employment policy account for the
sharp rise in the number of unemployed and retirees in the
ISJP's 1996 sample. The latter phenomenon is not a function
of increased average age in Hungary (the two samples are
not significantly different in terms of age) but rather of the
rapid increase in early retirements as a result of economic
restructuring and increasing health problems.
The increase in early retirements has contributed to the
emergence of a relatively large new stratum of poor  peo
ple whose jobs became redundant and who have no convert
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ible skills (such as workers in mining and heavy industry»)
Those people have no prospect of finding new positions and
are increasingly marginalized. In absolute terms, they are the
big losers in the transition process.
In relative terms, however, the middle class has lost even
more. Between 1990 and 1995, the middle strata in
Hungarian society suffered a 20 percent decline in real
income. 4 The country's middle class was in pal1 a function
of the abundance of state-provided jobs, but an even broad
er and bigger middle stratum emerged in the 1980s, primar
ily as a result of activities in the shadow economy. Some
Hungarian authors have come to refer to those groups as
middle class. albeit without the classic middle-class features
of autonomy, democratic attachment, and a Weberian work
ethic. S Furthermore. since the communists forbade private
ownership of the "means of production," the middle class was
entirely dependent on either state redistributive mechanisms
or the shadow economy. So when both of those collapsed after
1989, many of those people were propelled into poorer social
strata, although a small number  mostly the younger gener
ation of state bureaucrats and managers  were able to capi
talize on the new processes of marketization and privatization.
The marketization of the economy and labor relations
increased the gap between the private and the state sectors.
The free-market economy and the liberal political system
eliminated the officialllpper limits on income, and that led to
further inequalities in income distribution. Moreover, the mid
dle-class groups that remained employed by the state (for
instance. in the health and education sectors. which remained
mostly nonprivatized) experienced the most drastic declines
in incomes, living standards, and consumption.
The middle class has experienced substantial downward
mobility. In practical terms, that meant that many people lost
their jobs and were either forced into early retirement or com
pelled to retrain for different jobs and positions. On the psy
chological level, it led to feelings of insecurity, uncertainty,
and fear for the future, all of which show up in answers to
other questions in the ISJP survey. Such feelings have, in tum,
fostered a strong conservative mentality, fearful of any
changes or programs that could bring new dangers and chal
lenges. and a false memory about and nostalgia for the Kadar
era (the last part of the cOtmnunist period).
RUSSIA'S SHRINKING 'MIDDLE CLASS'
The Soviet Union, even more than the other communist
states, had a particularly large "middle class" due to the per
vasive and extensive nature of the socialized economy. The
transition to a market economy has had a particularly
3Zsuzsa Ferge, "A rendszervallas nyertesei es vesztesei" [Winners and
Losers in the Transition]. in R. Andorka, T. Kolosi, and G. Vukovich, eds.,
Tarsadalmi Ripon [Social Report] (Budapest: TARKI, 1996). pp. 414-443.
"T. Kolosi and M. Sagi, "Rendszervaltas es tar.;adalrni szerkezet" [Transition
and Social Stratification] ill R. Andorka, T. Kolosi. and G. Vukovich. eds..
Tarsodalmi Riporl [Social Report] (Budapest: TARKl. 1996), pp. J49--197.
5See Endre Bilecz, "A polgarosodas es dell1okratizalodas zsakutcai a mai
magyar larsadalomban" [The Dead End of the Process of Upward Mobility
and Democratization in Contemporary Hungary], in AmI {( Magyar
[Hungarian Harvest) (Budapest: MTA. 1988). pp. 32-47; and Erzsebet
Szalai, "Gazdasagi lUechaniszmus es nagyva1Jalali crdek" [Economic
Reform and Managerial InterestsJ, Kozgozr1ossagi Szemle. vol. 36, no. 1,
January 1989, pp. 9-39.

The 1996 International Social Justice Project sur
vey found interesting differences along ethnic lines in
Estonia. Estonians and ethnic Russians have different
perceptions about current and past social standing and
economic well-being, as well as differences in employ
ment status. In 1996, ethnic Russians were somewhat
more dissatisfied with the standard of living than were
Estonians. But Estonians were much more likely to
remember being dissatisfied in 1990 (24 percent) than
Russians (11 percent).
Similarly, Estonians rated their current social posi
tions higher (4.7) than did ethnic Russians (3.95). On
the other band, ethnic Russians remembered their 1990
status as higher (5.96) than Estonians (5.54). Thus a
much larger percentage of ethnic Russians (71 percent)
perceived a loss in position than Estonians (47 percent).
Moreover, in 1996, ethnic Russians were significantly
more likely to be unemployed than Estonians (9.9 per
cent compared with 4.6 percent) and somewhat less
likely to be retired or working full time.

destructive impact on that stratum, a significant part of
which has shifted into lower economic and social positions.
As sociologist Tatyana Zaslavaskaya has pointed out. the
only people who have really benefited from economic and
social transition are those with "marketable resources,"
including entrepreneurs, service workers, the top layers of
the intelligentsia, the "workers' elite" (highly qualified and
skilled workers), and people from law-enforcement agencies.
On the flip side of that coin, the changing economy and the
economic crisis have dealt particularly harsh blows to indus
trial workers, unskilled workers, peasants, and clerical work
ers. The bulk of the intelligentsia (white-collar and profes
sional workers), which used to occupy the middle positions of
the sociaJ structure, has split into two directions: some have
fallen in status, joining the ranks of the unemployed or
becoming simple clerical workers; while others have man
aged to move upward into the ranks of the top intelligentsia,
for example, by becoming managers and professionals. 6
As in the Hungatian case, the biggest cause of the expan
sion of the lower class and the contraction of the middle class
is the increase in unemployment and early retirement, and that
has particularly affected the older generation. In fact, age is
the single biggest socioeconomic detemlinant of subjective
social status in Russia in 1996 (in the 1991 lSJP survey, age
was not a statisticaJly significant determinant of such status).
During the Soviet period, higher education guaranteed job
security and higher status. Today, however, education is a
much less important determinant of social class.

6T. I. Zaslavskaya, "Stratifikatsiya sovremCOllogo obschestva" [Stratification

of Contemporary Russian Society). Economic and Social Change. 171e
Monitoring of Public Opinion, no. 1 (Moscow: Russian Center for Public
Opinion Research, 1996), pp. 3-7.

Intergenerational tension and conflict have historically
played a big role in the evolution of Russian society, as man
ifested in the traditional dilemmas of .'fathers and sons."7 The
current social transformation, however, has made the gener
ational dimension central. There is an obvious and growing
gap between the younger and older generations, which did
not exist in 1991. In 1996, for example, only 6 percent of
the youngest age group (18-26) considered themselves in
the lower social class, whereas 32 percent of the oldest
group (66-75) did. Conversely, 47 percent of the youngest
age group considered themselves in the middle class, while
only 12 percent of the oldest group did. Those differences
are continuous across all age categories and do not just
reflect the extremes.
Meager resources render the older generation particlllar
ly dependent upon the state; at a time when the govern
ment's financial troubles are jeopardizing the entire welfare
system. The average retirement pension in today's Russia is
only 84 percent of the minimum subsistence level, forcing
a big proportion of the older generation into poverty. The
generation gap is not just a financial one, but also a social
and cultural one. Many older people are experiencing a loss
of social status and respect, which they had hoped and
expected to secure as a reward in their old age.
PROGRESS THROUGH INEQUALITY?
The changes in the post-communist states are not just
political and economic but social as well, involving funda
mental changes in the objective and subjective social struc
tures. Poverty and wealth are increasing at the same time,
causing increased societal polarization.
The shifting of the social and class structure is, of
course, making those societies more like Western ones,
just as the economic and political transitions are, and that
may be good news for the efforts of the market-oriented
governments in these countries. Probably a capitalist
economy could not coexist with social structures as egali
tarian as those that prevailed in the communist era. The
governments of the post-communist states can hope that
the expansion of poverty and the generalized loss of social
position are only temporary phenomena. Since it is older
people who are most affected by these changes, it is only
a matter of time until they are replaced in the labor force
by those younger and more adaptable. And as the econo
my improves - as the reformers hope and expect - the
governments should be able to afford more substantial
welfare programs.
But in the short run, the growing poverty and inequali
ty, and the widespread sense of social and economic decline
- in societies that are still generally much more egalitari
an and statist than those in Western Europe and (especially)
the United States - are bound to cause problems for the
reformers, •
lN9700721 FEBRUARY 1997

7B. V. DUbin, "0 pokoJenecheskoll\ mekhanizme sotsialnykh izmenenii"
[The Generational Mechanism of Social Change), in T. I. Zaslavskaya, ed.,
Kuda idel Rossiya? Allema/ivy obschesrvennogo razviliya II [Whither
Russia? Alternatives of Societal Development III (Moscow: Aspect Press,
1995), pp. 237-247.
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